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own wrong."28 In Lowe v. Quinn, the defendant-donee would make
a profit. The ring was worth $60,000. In the instant case, Justice Tilzer,
dissenting, made the interesting observation in regard to defendant's
wrongful conduct that it was not the plaintiff-donor attempting to take
another man's wife, but it was the defendant-donee seeking to take
another woman's husband. "And while it may be that the plaintiff's
hands are not too clean, the defendant's hands are covered with more
than diamonds." 29
Throughout history, the donor's attempts to recover an engagement
ring after his intended wife jilted him have proved successful. In
Pennsylvania, the trend of the law in allowing the donor to recover
the engagement ring when the donee breaks the engagement is clear.
In the instant case, the equities in favor of the plaintiff-donor are mani-
fest. If a case such as Lowe v. Quinn should come before a court of
Pennsylvania, it is submitted that the court would allow recovery for
the plaintiff-donor.
William C. Costopoulos
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-QUALIFICATIONS OF CONGRESSMEN-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that Congress, in judging
the qualifications of its members, is limited to the standing qualifica-
tions prescribed by the Constitution.
Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).
In November, 1966, petitioner Powell was elected from the 18th Con-
gressional District of New York to serve in the House of Representatives
for the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House Resolution,
Powell was not permitted to take his seat.' He then filed suit in the
28. Furman v. Krauss, 175 Misc. 1018, 1021, 26 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1941), afJ'd, 262 App.
Div. 1016, 30 N.Y.S.2d 848, (1941).
29. Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (1969).
1. Powell was denied his seat in the following manner. During the 89th Congress, a
special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration conducted
an investigation into the expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor, of
which Powell was the Chairman. The special Subcommittee issued a report concluding
that Powell and certain staff employees had deceived the House authorities as to travel
expenses and that there was strong evidence that certain illegal salary payments had been
made to Powell's wife. (H.R. REP. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966).) No further
action was taken until just prior to the organization of the 90th Congress, when the
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federal district court claiming that the House could exclude him only
if it found that he failed to meet the standing requirements of age,
citizenship, and residence as contained in Article I, § 2, of the Con-
stitution-requirements which the House specifically found that Powell
met. The district court dismissed petitioner's complaint "for want of
jurisdiction of the subject matter. ' 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal, although on somewhat different grounds.3 The United
States Supreme Court held that it was error to dismiss the complaint,
and that petitioner Powell was entitled to his seat in the 90th Congress.
4
The Court reached the following conclusions: (1) that this case had
not been mooted by petitioner's seating in the 91st Congress; (2) that
although this action should be dismissed against respondent Congress-
men, it could be sustained against their agents; (3) that the 90th Con-
gress' denial of membership to Powell could not be treated as an
expulsion; (4) that the federal district court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this controversy; and (5) that the case was justiciable.5
Article I, § 5, of the Constitution gives the House of Representatives
authority to punish a member for disorderly behavior and to expel a
member "with the concurrence of two-thirds."
Whether or not this power extends over members-elect who were
Democratic members-elect voted to remove Powell as Chairman of his Committee. (H.R.
REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967).)
When the 90th Congress met to organize, Powell was asked to step aside while the oath
was administered to the other members-elect. The House adopted a resolution which pro-
vided that the Speaker appoint a Select Committee to determine Powell's eligibility. The
Select Committee, on February 23, 1967, found that Powell met the standing qualifications
of Article 1, Sec. 2. H.R. REP., No. 27, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 31 (1967).); and recommended
that Powell be seated as a member of the 90th Congress, but that he be censured by the
House, fined $40,000, and be deprived of his seniority.
The report was presented to the House on March 1, 1967. An amendment was offered
calling for the exclusion of Powell and a declaration that his seat was vacant. The amend-
ment was adopted by a vote of 248 to 176 and Powell was prevented from taking his seat
in the 90th Congress.
2. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3. The Court of Appeals held that a claim of Congressman-elect was one "arising under
the Constitution" within the constitutional provision extending federal judicial power to
causes and controversies arising under the Constitution. The court stated that on this
basis, the District Court did, in fact, have subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
statute giving District Courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions which arise under the
Constitution is a grant of jurisdiction to entertain action of Congressman-elect for injunc-
tive relief, mandamus and declaratory judgment on the basis that his exclusion from
membership in the House of Representatives was in violation of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 2 cl. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a). Nevertheless, the District Court's dismissal
was affirmed on the ground that the issues raised by the action were non-justiciable and
that the Resolution of the House of Representatives excluded Congressman from the
statute requiring three judge District Courts to hear application for injunctions restrain-
ing enforcement of an act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution. Powell v. McCor-
mack, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 395 F.2d 577 (C.A.D.C.), C.R. 1968.
4. Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944.
5. Id., at 1979.
.191
Duquesne Law Review
guilty of misconduct during a previous Congressional session is not
stated in the Constitution. The Court decided that the power did not
extend over members-elect and that Powell, therefore, could not be
"excluded." 6
Powell's alleged misconduct occurred prior to the convening of the
90th Congress. The House has on various occasions debated whether
a member can be expelled for misconduct during a previous Congress,
and the House's own manual of applicable procedure in the 90th
Congress states that "both Houses have distrusted this power to punish
in such cases.' ' 7 The report of the Select Committee appointed by the
69th Congress, first session, to consider the expulsion of John W.
Langley, states unequivocally, that the House will not expel a member
for misconduct committed during an earlier Congress.8
It is clear that Congressional power to expel does not entail a cor-
responding power to exclude. However, the question of what the
limitations are on Congressional power to expel or otherwise punish
a member once he has been seated remains unanswered. A controversy
also remains as to whether the exclusionary power can be limited by
the judiciary. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the instant case, con-
tended that if this were an expulsion case, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of the House, no justiciable controversy would be presented.
Notwithstanding this contention, the majority's opinion is significantly
inconclusive on this issue. The Court has left the door open to further
litigation in this area, and retained the possibility of a powerful check
on the legislative branch of government, should the question be resolved
in the affirmative in the future.
There was considerable question as to whether the federal courts
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. The district court
determined that to decide this case on the merits would be a clear
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court of Appeals,
6. Powell was "excluded" from the 90th Congress, i.e., he was not administered the
oath of office and was prevented from taking his seat. If he had been allowed -to take the
oath and subsequently had been required to surrender his. seat, the action of the House
would have constituted an "expulsion."
7. Rules of House of RepresentativesH.R. Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1925).
8. H.R. REP. No: 30, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2,(1925). It is noteworthy that the instant
opinion does not settle the question-of whether the House can punish for previous mis-
conduct in another Congressional session. 'There is strong dicta indicating the negative of
the above proposition however, Congress -could seemingly settle the controversy by insti-
tuting a provision in its rules covering this subject.
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however, thought that separation of powers was more importantly con-
sidered in determining whether or not the issue was justiciable.9
The Supreme Court has established comprehensive guidelines for
identifying federal subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability. Mr.
Justice Brennan announced in the case of Baker v. Carr'° that: (1) if
the cause does not "arise under" the Federal Constitution, Laws, or
Treaties; (2) or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of
Article III; (3) or if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional
statute, then the Federal Courts cannot properly assume subject matter
jurisdiction." Since the instant case presents for the first time the ques-
tion of whether the federal courts can consider claims that a member-
elect has been improperly excluded from his seat in the House of
Representatives, the application of the above guidelines presents as
Mr. Justice Brennan termed in Baker "a delicate exercise in Constitu-
tional interpretation.' 12
Mr. Chief Justice Warren rejected the respondent's contention that
this is not a case "arising under" the Constitution within the meaning
of Article III. Respondent urged that certain constitutional delega-
tions' 3 are explicit grants of judicial power to the Congress and con-
stitute specific exceptions to the general mandate of Article III, which
vests judicial power in the federal courts. The classic test to determine
whether or not a suit "arises under" the Constitution is whether the
petitioner's claims will be sustained or defeated depending upon the
construction given to the Constitution. 4 On this basis, the Court con-
cluded that it was evident that judicial power extended over this case.15
9. The District Court determined that to decide this case on the merits would con-
stitute a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and then dismissed the
complaint for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.
Supp. 354, 359 (1967). However, the Court of Appeals recognized that the doctrine of
separation of powers is more properly considered in determining whether the case is
justiciable. 395 F.2d. at 593, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116
(1966).
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, (1962).
11. Id., at 198.
12. Id.
13. U.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 5, assigns to each House of Congress the power to judge the
elections and qualifications of its own members and to punish its members for disorderly
conduct. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 states that the Senate has "sole power" to try all impeach-
ments.
14. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). See also King County v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, 263 U.S. 361, 363-364 (1923). See, generally, WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 48-52,
(1963).
15. Respondents also claimed lack of jurisdiction as not being authorized by a juris-
dictional statute, i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), (1964), which provides that the District Courts
193
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Having concluded that the federal courts had subject matter juris-
diction, the Court turned to the question of justiciability. With regard
to this problem, the Court was confronted by two determinations: first,
whether the claim asserted and the relief sought are of the type which
admit of judicial resolution; and secondly, whether the structure of
the Federal Government renders the issue a "political question," i.e., a
question which the federal courts will not adjudicate because of the
doctrine of separation of powers.16 In resolving the former, the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr stated that
in the instance of nonjusticiability consideration of the cause is
not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the court's inquiry
necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty
asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially deter-
mined and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.' 7
Respondents did not seriously contend that the duty asserted and its
alleged breach could not be judicially determined. However, the
respondents did maintain, and the Court of Appeals agreed, 18 that it
was impossible for a federal court to mold effective relief. Powell
sought both coercive relief and a declaratory judgment.19 The Supreme
Court did not consider Powell's request for coercive relief since the
district court could have granted the request for a declaratory judg-
ment.20 The availability of coercive relief is contingent upon whether
there is a "live" controversy between the litigants, 21 while a request for
declaratory relief may be considered independently regardless of
shall have jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy "arises under"
the Constitution. Respondent urged a narrow construction of the above statute but the
instant court refused to adopt this interpretation, stating that it had generally been recog-
nized that the intent of the drafters was to provide a broad jurisdiction grant to the
Federal Courts. See Mishkin, The Federal Question in District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
157, 160 (1953).
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, (1966). See also
Sevilla v. Elizalde, 72 App. D.C. 108, 112 F.2d 29, at 32, 37 (1940).
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198.
18. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 596.
19. The coercive relief sought by Powell included: (1) to enjoin execution of House
Resolution 278; (2) to require the Speaker of the House to administer the oath of office to
Powell; (3) to enjoin all members of the House from any action to enforce Resolution 278
or otherwise to deny Powell his seat; and (4) for injunctive and mandatory relief addressed
to non-elected employees of the House relating to access to the House, pay, and other
prerequisites of the office of a member.
• 20. The Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964), provides that a District
Court may "declare the rights . . . of any interested party whether or not further relief
is or could be sought."
21. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
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whether other forms of relief are appropriate. 22 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that in applying the general criteria of justiciability, as an-
nounced in the Baker case, this case is generally justiciable.
Even with the determination that the case was justiciable, the prob-
lem remained as to whether this cause presented a political question.
The fact that a claim seeks the enforcement of a political right or a
claim to political office may superficially raise speculation that it is a
political question.23 The term "political" is employed to distinguish
between controversies which are essentially for decision by the political
branches from those which are essentially for adjudication by the
judicial branch.2 4 In some areas the political question can be readily
discerned; for example, the construction of foreign policy is vested
exclusively in the Executive 2 5 and the power to declare war or raise
armies is vested in the Congress.2 6 However, even in these areas prob-
lems may arise on the peripheries so that the labels of "foreign policy"
and "state of war" are not automatic bars to judicial scrutiny.27 Non-
justiciability of an issue because it is determined to be essentially polit-
ical is a doctrine peculiar to confrontations with the federal estab-
lishment and results from the fundamental structure of our system
of divided and separate powers.2 8 Taking caution to avoid any attempt
to enunciate exclusive criteria for identifying a political question, Mr.
Justice Brennan in Baker announced six factors to be found "on the
surface" of a case of this nature. They are:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a co-ordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.29
22. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93 (1947).
23. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, (1966).
24. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv.
485 (1924); McCloskey, Forward: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54, 59-64
(1962).
25. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319.
26. U.S..CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
27. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, (1897); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212-213.
28. 369 U.S. at 210.
29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Baker made it clear that the presence of any one of these six factors
or a combination thereof may be a bar to justiciability.
The respondent urged the Supreme Court to adopt the first criterion
noted above, i.e., that there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment to the House of the judicial power to determine Powell's
qualifications. In order to ascertain if such a commitment exists, the
Court had to determine what power the Constitution confers upon the
House through Article I, § 5. Adhering to the guidelines of Baker,
which required in deciding "whether a matter had in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or
whether that action exceeds whatever authority had been committed,30
required a careful exercise in constitutional interpretation. The Court
indulged in an extensive historical analysis including the pre-conven -
tion precedents of the English Parliament and American colonial
assemblies, and actual convention debates, in order to resolve this
question. The respondents moved for a broad interpretation which
would grant the House extensive powers to judge qualifications of its
members. The respondents asserted that the exclusion precedents of
the Alex Nowell 3' and Robert Walpole cases,32 both being expelled
from the House of Commons, firmly establish the power of a legisla-
tive body to be the sole judge of its member's qualifications. However,
the respondent failed to recognize an extremely relevant distinction-
that the above cases clearly illustrated that a member could be excluded
only if he had been previously, expelled. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
agreed with the petitioner's narrow construction of Article I, § 5, that
the records of debates during the Constitutional Convention and dur-
ing the post ratification period render the House without authority
to exclude any person who has met the standing qualifications and who
has been duly elected. Although the historic pattern of the Congress
has been erratic,33 bringing forth vehement dissents when someone
30. Id., at 211.
31. J. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 1485-1603, at 596 (2d ed. 1930).
32. 17 H.C. JOUR. 28.
33. For example, in 1870 the House refused to exclude a Texas Congressman accused
of a variety of criminal acts; I Hinds Sec.465; but in 1882 and again in 1900 the House
excluded a member-elect for practicing polygamy. 1 Hinds Sec 473, 477-480. Thereafter,
it apparently did not consider excluding anyone until shortly after World War I, when it
twice excluded Victor L. Berger, an avowed Socialist, for giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. Significantly, the House committee investigating Berger concluded that he was
ineligible under the express provision of Sec. 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 C. CAN-
NON, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 56-59, (1935). Berger, the last person
to be excluded from the House prior to Powell, was later re-elected and finally admitted
after his criminal conviction was reversed. 65 Cong. Rec. 7 (1923).
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was excluded, the Court admitted that, were the Congressional exclu-
sions precedents more consistent, their precedental value would remain
quite limited, because their value lies solely in their ability to shed
some insights on correctly' ascertaining the draftman's intent. The
evidence of Congress' early understanding confirms the conclusion
that the House lacks power to exclude members-elect who meet standing
qualifications. 34
Nor were any of the other formulations of the political question
doctrine "inextricable from the case at bar." 35 The Court found that
each would require no more than a mere interpretation of the Con-
-stitution. It is settled doctrine that a case presents a political question
if judicial resolution would produce a potentially embarrassing con-
frontation between coordinate branches of government.3 6 The potential
threat presented by this decision to Congressional expulsion power
.can in fact be very embarrassing and may elicit a Constitutional crisis
of immense proportions. Fully cognizant of this possibility, the Court
issued a warning to the legislature, by asserting that the federal courts
on occasion must interpret the Constitution at variance with the con-
struction given the document by another branch.37 The overriding
,significance of this decision as a possible infringement on the powers
of a coordinate branch may render an irreparable breach in the checks
and balances system by channeling too much power in the federal
judiciary.
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion attacks the majority's con-
clusions on the issues of mootness and the Speech and Debate Clause.
Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues are no longer "live" or
the parties lack a legal cognizable interest in the outcome.88 Moreover,
where one of the issues becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply
the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.3 9 The majority
The House next considered the problem in 1925 when it contemplated excluding John
W. Langley for his alleged _misconduct. Langley resigned after losing a criminal appeal,
and the House therefore never voted upon the question. 6 CANNON § 238. The most recent
exclusion attempt prior to Powell's occurred in 1933, when the House refused to exclude
a Representative from Minnesota who had been convicted of sending defamatory matter
through the mail. 77 CONG. REc. 73-74, 131-139 (1933). '
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52 2 ELIOT'S DEBATES, 292-293; 10 HOLDSWORTH' A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW, 540-542; 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTTUTION, 257 (1876); 3 ELIOT'S
DEBATES 8.
35. Baker v. Carr, 369. U.S. 186, 217."
36. Id., at 198.
37. In fact, the Court has noted that it is an inadmissible suggestion that action might
be taken in disregard of judicial finding. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892).
38. See E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 35-37 (2d ed., 1941).
39. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75, 86-94 (1941).,
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used the unresolved issue of whether Powell was entitled to back pay
as the gateway to the merits of the case. 40 Powell's subsequent seating
in the 91st Congress raised the question of whether this seating mooted
petitioner's claims that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his
seniority; that the $25,000 fine imposed by the 91st Congress was a
continuation of the alleged illegal exclusion; and that he was entitled
to be paid for the period during which he was excluded.41 Applying
the "live issue" test stated earlier, the majority concluded that Powell's
claim for back pay was viable making it unnecessary to determine
whether the other contentions were moot. The dissenting opinion
argues that a more appropriate criterion would have been whether the
respondents adequately met the burden of proving that "subsequent
events have made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful be-
havior could not reasonably be expected to occur" again.42 Moreover,
Mr. Justice Stewart believed that voluntary cessation of unlawful con-
duct does make a case moot if the defendant can demonstrate that
there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.43
It is submitted that Mr. Justice Stewart's standards are remarkably
deficient in adequate objective safeguards if they rely upon respond-
ent's contentions that such activities will not occur in the future. Since
the past history of the Congress is replete with such occurrences,44
similar happenings are likely unless judicial or legislative guidelines
are established for preventative purposes.
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart argued that the
majority's conclusion that Powell's back salary claim was viable was
not sufficient to allow the court to go to the merits of the case. In doing
this, the dissent blatantly disregarded the mandate of Bond v. Floyd,4 5
which states that the mootness of a primary claim does not require a
conclusion that all claims are moot. The dissent relied on A lejandrino
v. Quezon,46 where a duly appointed Senator of the Philippines was
40. The rule that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a moot
case is a result of the Constitutional doctrine that judicial power extends only to cases or
controversies. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968); R. ROBERSON AND F. KIRKHAM,
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, § 270-271.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
43. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
44. Note the attempted exclusions of a Texas Congressman, 1 Hinds § 465; Victor
L. Berger, 6 CANNON, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, §§ 56-59; John
W. Langley, 6 CANNON, 238; and Theodore C. Bilbo, 93 CONC. Rc. 3-28.
45. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
46. 271 U.S. 528 (1926).
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suspended for one year by the Philippine Senate for misconduct. When
the appeal reached the United States Supreme Court, his suspension
had expired and the Court dismissed as moot his claims. The Court
considered Alejandrino's claim for back pay as sufficient for a mandamus
for this purpose, but concluded that he had not sufficiently briefed the
salary issue and his mandamus request did not state the officials against
whom the mandamus should issue. The Supreme Court distinguished
Powell's claims, since Powell very clearly named the officials respon-
sible for payment of salaries and requested both a.mandamus and an
injunction against that official. 47 Alejandrino stands only for the prop-
osition that where one claim has become moot and the pleadings are
insufficient to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to another
remedy, the action should be dismissed as moot.48 But the Alejandrino
opinion recognized and stated that a properly pleaded mandamus action
could be brought, thus impliedly saying that his salary claim was
not moot.
4 9
Lastly, Mr. Justice Stewart contended that the Speech and Debate
Clause of the Constitution, Article I, § 6,50 was an absolute bar to
petitioner's action. The Speech and Debate Clause bars action against
Congressmen in order to make their job of representation free from
fear. 51 The reach of the clause was first articulated in Kilbourn v.
Thompson,52 and followed in Dombrowski v. Eastland,53 which state
that an action against a Congressman may be barred by the Speech and
Debate Clause. However, even though Congressmen may be free from
liability, legislative employees who participate in unconstitutional
47. Paragraph 18b of petitioner's complaint asserts that "Leake W. Johnson, as Ser-
geant-at-Arms of the House" is responsible for a refusal to pay Powell's salary and peti-
tioner prays for an injunction restraining the Sergeant-at-Arms from implementing the
House Resolution depriving the petitioner of his salary as well as mandamus to order
that the salary be paid.
48. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. at 535.
49. The dissent noted the following questions: is the Sergeant-at-Arms the only neces-
sary defendant; if the Speaker does not issue the requisite certificates and Congress does
not rescind House Resolution 278, can the House agents be enjoined to act in direct
contravention of the orders of their employers; and since the office of Sergeant-at-Arms
serves the 91st Congress, if he were made a party in that capacity, would he have authority
-or could the 91st Congress confer the authority-to dispurse money for a salary owed
to a representative in the previous Congress, particularly one who never took the oath of
office. 89 S. Ct. 1989.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, provides, in relevant part, "for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
place."
51. Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
52. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
53. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
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activity are responsible for their acts.54 In-Kilbourn the Supreme Court
allowed the petitioner to bring his false imprisonment action against
the House's Sergeant-at-Arms, and in Dombrowski suit was permitted
against a chief counsel of a Senate Subcommittee. The application of
the doctrine announced in the above cases allows the Court to disregard
whether under the Speech and Debate Clause petitioner would be
entitled to maintain this action solely against members of Congress
where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other
remedy was available.
It is submitted that the significance of this decision lies in two areas:
first, it manifests the court's intention to grant the electorate at large
more political effectiveness by strengthening the power of the popular
vote and by barring a possible limitation on whom the people may
choose to represent them. Finally, this decision may be the catalyst
which destroys Congress' "laissez-faire" policy towards the Supreme
Court's subject matter jurisdiction. A Constitutional crisis may be
in the offing if Powell attempts to recover his back pay and seniority
in the face of Congressional resistance to this Court's judgment.
Elmer S. Beatty, Jr.
54. Id., at 83.
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